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though an excise tax created a lien 
upon the land between the time the 
property was sold and the time the tax 
was paid, this lien did not convert the 
tax into a tax upon real estate; it re-
mained a tax upon the Indians' activity 
of selling the land. Id. at 693-94. 
In County of Yakima v. Yakima 
Indian Nation, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Act explicitly autho-
rized taxation of fee patented land but 
not taxation with respect to or involv-
ing land, or based upon the value of 
land. As a result, counties are forbid-
den to impose an excise tax on fee 
patented land. While this decision 
clarified the limits upon which a county 
may tax fee patented property held by 
individual tribe members, it also de-
prived these Indians ofthe federal pro-
tection from state and local taxation 
originally given to them by Congress. 
- Carolyn M Brennan 
Dawson v. Delaware: EVIDENCE 
OF DEFENDANT'S RACIST AS-
SOCIATIONS OR BELIEFS NOT 
ADMISSIBLE IN CAPITAL SEN-
TENCING PROCEEDING UN-
LESS RELEVANT TO THE IS-
SUES ADDRESSED IN THE UN-
DERL YING CONVICTION. 
In Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 
1093 (1992), the United States Su-
preme Court held that in a capital sen-
tencing proceeding, evidence of the 
defendant's membership in a racist 
prison gang was inadmissible because 
it was not relevant to the issues being 
decided at the penalty proceeding or 
related to the underlying conviction. 
In vacating the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Delaware, the Court 
determined that the admission of a 
stipulation evidencing the defendant's 
membership in the Aryan Brotherhood 
violated his First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights under the United 
States Constitution. 
David Dawson and three other in-
mates escaped from a Delaware prison 
in late 1986. After burglarizing a house 
in Kenton, Delaware, Dawson pro-
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ceeded to another house nearby where 
he brutally murdered a white woman 
and then stole her car and money. 
Dawson was subsequently apprehended 
by the police. 
At trial, the jury convicted Dawson 
of first-degree murder, possession ofa 
deadly weapon during the commission 
of a felony, and various other crimes. 
A penalty hearing was then held before 
the jury to determine whether to im-
pose the death penalty for the first 
degree murder conviction. 
The State notified the court that it 
intended to introduce expert testimony 
pertaining to Dawson's membership 
in a prison gang known as the Aryan 
Brotherhood ("Brotherhood") as well 
as evidence of Dawson's tatoos and 
other indicia of his membership in the 
Brotherhood. The State submitted that 
such testimony would explain the ori-
gin and nature of the Brotherhood. 
Dawson opposed admission of such 
evidence arguing that its admission 
would be inflammatory and would vio-
late his rights under the First and F our-
teenth Amendments. 
Prior to the start of the penalty 
hearing, the parties agreed upon a ne-
gotiated stipulation concerning the 
evidence of the defendant's member-
ship in the Brotherhood. In essence, 
the stipulation stated that the Brother-
hood was a white racist prison gang 
which originated in California and that 
separate gangs existed in Delaware 
using the same name. As a condition 
of the stipulation, the State did not 
introduce expert testimony during the 
penalty phase. 
During the penalty hearing, the State 
introduced the stipulation, Dawson's 
tatoos relating to the Brotherhood, his 
use of the name "Abaddan," and his 
lengthy criminal record. In rebuttal, 
Dawson presented mitigating "good 
character" evidence consisting oftesti-
mony of family members and records 
of his enrollment in drug and alcohol 
programs in prison for which he had 
received good time credits. 
The jury concluded that the miti-
gating evidence was outweighed by 
the aggravating evidence and recom-
mended that Dawson receive the death 
penalty. Upon that binding recom-
mendation, Dawson was so sentenced. 
The Supreme Court of Delaware, 
holding that it was desirable for the 
jury to have as much information be-
fore it as possible during the penalty 
hearing, affirmed the underlying con-
viction and the death penalty. The 
United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to consider whether the ad-
mission of evidence concerning 
Dawson's membership in the Brother-' 
hood during the sentencing proceeding 
violated his First and Fourteenth 
Amendment constitutional rights. 
The Court began its analysis by 
addressing Dawson's argument that 
theFirst Amendment absolutely barred 
the admission of evidence of an 
individual's beliefs or associations 
during a sentencing proceeding. 
Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1096. While 
recognizing that the First Amendment 
protects an "individual's right to join 
groups and associate with others," the 
Court rejected Dawson's assertion be-
cause it was overly broad. Id. By 
doing so, the Court reinforced its pre-
vious position that the sentencing au-
thority is "free to consider a wide range 
of relevant material," even that mate-
rial which may otherwise be constitu-
tionally protected. Id. at 1097. 
Having recognized that in certain 
instances otherwise constitutionally 
protected material may be admitted 
during a sentencing proceeding, the 
Court then considered whether the ad-
mission of the stipulation as to 
Dawson's membership in the Dela-
ware chapter of the Brotherhood was 
constitutional error. Id. at 1097. The 
touchstone ofthe Court's inquiry was 
whether the stipulation was in any way 
relevant to the issues to be determined 
in the sentencing proceeding. Id. 
The Court first noted that the ab-
sence of expert testimony to show the 
violent nature of the Brotherhood lim-
itedthe relevancy ofthe admitted stipu-
lation. Id. The Court reasoned that the 
narrow phrasing ofthe stipulation said 
nothing about the character of the Dela-
ware chapter ofthe Brotherhood since 
it failed to link the beliefs of the Cali-
fornia chapter to the Delaware chapter. 
Id. at 1098. The Court thus concluded 
that the narrow phrasing ofthe stipula-
tion impermissibly invited the jury to 
infer that the abstract beliefs of the 
Delaware chapter were identical to those 
of the California chapter. Id. 
The Court assumed for the sake of 
argument that the beliefs of the Dela-
ware chapter were shown to be racist, 
concluded that evidence of Dawson's 
membership in the Brotherhood was 
nevertheless irrelevant because both 
Dawson and his victim were of the 
same race. Id. The Court distin-
guished Dawson from other cases 
where it had held membership in an 
organization to be relevant for sentenc-
ing purposes. In those cases, the mem-
bership was in some way related to the 
underlying crime of conviction and 
probative of the defendant's bias or 
indicative of his propensity for future 
violence. Id. (citingBarciayv. Florida, 
463 U.S. 939 (1983)) For example, in 
Barclay, the defendant's membership 
in the Black Liberation Army was rel-
evant in a sentencing proceeding be-
cause the underlying conviction was 
for the murder of a white hitchhiker. 
Similarly, in United States v. Abel, 469 
U.S. 45 (1984), the evidence of the 
defendant's and a defense witness' 
membership in the Aryan Brotherhood 
was relevant because the members 
were sworn to lie on behalf of each 
other. 
Unlike these cases cited by the 
Court, the stipulation as to Dawson's 
membership in the Delaware chapter 
of the Brotherhood was not related to 
the underlying conviction and did not 
establish that the Brotherhood had a 
propensity for violent acts. Therefore, 
Dawson's membership in the Brother-
hood was not relevant to the sentenc-
ing proceeding. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 
1098. 
Finally, the Court rejected the state's 
assertion that the stipulation was rel-
evant to prove any aggravating cir-
cumstance. Id. The Court recognized 
that in certain instances membership in 
an organization, such as one that en-
dorses racial killing, may be relevant 
to the jury's inquiry as to whether a 
defendant would be likely to commit 
futureviolentacts. However, the Court 
reasoned that the inference which the 
jury was invited to draw from the stipu-
lation proved nothing more than the 
abstract beliefs of the Delaware chap-
ter of the Brotherhood. The Court 
concluded that with nothing more than 
an abstract showing of Dawson's be-
liefs, the admission of the stipulation 
violated Dawson's First Amendment 
rights. Id. 
In Dawson v. Delaware, the United 
States Supreme Court refined the test 
for determining the admissibility of 
evidence of organizational associations 
and beliefs in a sentencing proceeding. 
Evidence ofa defendant's associations 
or abstract beliefs must be relevant to 
the issues being decided or related to 
the underlying conviction in order to 
protect a defendant's First Amendment 
rights. This decision illustrates the 
Court's fear that the defendant may be 
unfairly prejudiced by the admission 
of such evidence. 
- David E. Canter 
White v. Illinois: SPONTANEOUS 
DECLARATION AND MEDICAL 
EXAMINATION HEARSAY EX-
CEPTIONS DO NOT OFFEND 
SIXTH AMENDMENT CON-
FRONTATION CLAUSE RE-
QUIREMENTSREGARDLESS OF 
DECLARANT'S AVAILABILITY. 
In White v. IllinOis, 112 S. Ct. 736 
(1992), the United States Supreme 
Court held that the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment ofthe 
U.S. Constitution does not require a 
declarant to testify at trial or be found 
unavailable by the trial court where the 
declarant's testimony can be admitted 
under an established hearsay excep-
tion. Because the declarant's out-of-
court statements carried substantial pro-
bative value that could not be dupli-
cated by mere courtroom repetition, 
the Court reasoned that the Confronta-
tion Clause did not require proof of 
unavailability before the statements 
were permitted under exceptions to the 
hearsay doctrine. 
Petitioner, Randall D. White, was 
charged with the sexual assault ofS. G~, 
a four year old girl. Trial testimony 
established that on April 16, 1988, 
S.G.'s babysitter, Tony DeVore, was 
awakened by screams coming from 
S.G.'s room. Upon nearing S.G.'s 
bedroom, DeVore witnessed White 
leaving the room. DeVore identified 
White as a friend ofthe child's mother, 
Tammy Grigsby. According to 
DeVore's trial testimony, S.G. stated 
that White had put his hand over her 
mouth, choked her, threatened to whip 
her if she screamed, and had "touch[ ed] 
her in the wrong places" (indicating 
the vaginal area). 
S.G. 's mother found her daughter 
"scared" and a "little hyper" when she 
returned home about thirty minutes 
after DeVore had first been awakened. 
S. G. repeated her claims to her mother, 
which led Grigsby to call the police. 
Officer Terry Lewis questioned S.G. 
alone upon arrival at the Grigsby resi-
dence a few minutes later. Lewis' 
summary of S. G. 's statements at trial 
indicated that, again, the child had 
given the same account oftheevening's 
events. The hospital personnel who 
examinedS.G. that night, nurse Cheryl 
Reents and Dr. Michael Meinzen, heard 
essentially the identical story S.O. told 
DeVore, Grigsby, and Lewis. 
S.O. did not testify at petitioner's 
trial, due to emotional difficulty upon 
entering the courtroom. DeVore, 
Grigsby, Lewis, Reents, and Meinzen 
testified at trial, all relating the account 
ofthe incident as told to them by S.G. 
Petitioner objected on hearsay grounds 
to the testimony of these witnesses, 
regarding S.G. 's statements to them. 
The trial court overruled each objec-
tion on the basis of relevant hearsay 
exceptions. Testimony given by 
DeVore, Grigsby, and Lewis was ad-
mitted under the spontaneous declara-
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